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ADDRESSING THE RETIREMENT CRISIS                   
WITH SHADOW 401(K)S 
Deepa Das Acevedo* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has been juggling a handful of socio-economic 
crises lately.  The subprime mortgage crisis, the auto industry crisis, the 
education crisis, the obesity crisis—the list isn’t short and shows no signs 
of becoming so.  Within this group of economically and socially disruptive 
developments, the “retirement crisis”—the idea that most Americans will 
lack the financial resources to be secure and relatively satisfied in their 
golden years—seems somewhat banal because, for the most part, it has yet 
to hit.  Even though baby boomers first started to age out of the workforce 
in 2011,1 the real cost of underfunded retirement is far less palpable than 
are the evictions, layoffs, and stock market fluctuations accompanying 
other difficult changes. 
But the retirement crisis may prove to be one of the most damaging 
developments facing contemporary America.  It invites procrastination, it’s 
remarkably immune to class and industry distinctions, and it’s actually two 
exceedingly complex problems.2  On the one hand, most Americans aren’t 
saving smartly or aggressively enough while they work, so the pot of 
money available to them at retirement is markedly insufficient.  On the 
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 1  See D’vera Cohn & Paul Taylor, Baby Boomers Approach 65—Glumly, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/12/20/baby-
boomers-approach-65-glumly/?beta=true&utm_expid=53098246-2.Lly4CFSVQG2lphsg-
KopIg.1&utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pewresearch.org%2Ftopics%2Fbaby-
boomers%2Fpages%2F2%2F.   
 2  See EDWARD N. WOLFF, ECON. POLICY INST., RETIREMENT INSECURITY: THE 
INCOME SHORTFALLS AWAITING THE SOON-TO-RETIRE 2 (2002). 
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other hand, and regardless of whether they’ve saved enough during their 
working years, most Americans aren’t properly managing or capable of 
properly managing their savings after they retire. 
These problems are challenging enough in themselves, but they 
become even more complicated if we focus on solutions that are politically 
feasible in the United States.  For better or for worse, when it comes to 
welfare state policies, we aren’t Denmark.3  This doesn’t mean that we 
shouldn’t reach a little in our efforts to address the retirement crisis—after 
all, a “crisis” demands “crisis management.”  But we need to work towards 
viable solutions, and we have to keep in mind that no solution is perfect.  
This Essay is a contribution toward that effort. 
I.     THE “SAVINGS PROBLEM” 
This Part explores three reasons why most Americans do not have 
enough savings accumulated by the time they retire: bad worker defaults, 
bad employer incentives, and low income.  The Part also introduces 
“Shadow 401(k)s” as a means of addressing the “savings problem.” 
A.   Bad Worker Defaults 
A host of default practices virtually ensure that workers do not save 
enough during their earning years for reasons other than a lack of money.4  
Workers may simply choose to allocate resources to things other than a 
retirement plan.  Workers may also fail to undertake crucial trigger actions, 
like enrolling in a defined contribution plan, choosing a fund into which to 
invest, or contributing enough to receive matching benefits from their 
employers.  This general problem—now a staple of cocktail conversations 
everywhere, thanks to Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler5—was 
significantly, if belatedly, addressed by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
(PPA).6 
The PPA grants a safe harbor to 401(k) plan sponsors who adopt 
automatic enrollments, employer contributions, default investments into 
 
 3  See Hillary Clinton, U.S. Presidential Candidate, The CNN Democratic 
Presidential Debate in Las Vegas, Nev. (Oct. 13, 2015) (transcript available from The CNN 
Democratic Debate Transcript, Annotated, WASH. POST: THE FIX, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/10/13/the-oct-13-democratic-
debate-who-said-what-and-what-it-means/) (“But we are not Denmark.  I love Denmark.  
We are the United States of America.”).   
 4  See Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives and 
Other Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX. REV. 471, 481–83 (2004).   
 5  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 103–17 (2008).   
 6  Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified in 
scattered sections of 5, 7, 19, 26, 29, 30 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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age-appropriate funds, and automatic increases in worker-contributions.7  
In return for establishing these defaults, the plan sponsor gets a safe harbor 
from undertaking expensive and complicated non-discrimination 
compliance testing respecting their plans and matching programs.8  In 
effect, the PPA has meant that millennials have almost always lived in a 
universe where contributions to retirement plans happen as a matter of 
course.9 
There’s a lot to like about the PPA, but it’s not all jam.  For one, the 
PPA does not supplant previously available safe harbor provisions, so plan 
sponsors don’t have to adopt PPA-compliant plans in order to gain its 
benefits.10  Secondly, the PPA actually lengthens the vesting period for 
employers’ matching contributions from “immediate[ly]” to “two years of 
service.”11  While we don’t know whether workers opt out more when 
matching benefits don’t vest immediately, this is just one more reason why 
we shouldn’t view the PPA as a cure-all for “trigger action” defaults. 
The biggest problem with relying on the PPA to increase savings rates 
is, of course, that employers need not establish any kind of pension plan let 
alone one that takes advantage of PPA safe harbor standards.12  As of 
March 2015, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that “[e]mployer-
provided retirement benefits were available to 31 percent of private 
industry workers in the lowest wage category.”13  If we want to take the 
retirement crisis seriously, it simply won’t do to gloat (or sigh) over the 
PPA while ignoring the fact that workers at the low end of the earning 
spectrum often lack any job-related infrastructure to save for retirement. 
So what are our options?  This Essay suggests authorizing the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) to create federally administered (though not 
 
 7  See EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PUB. 3998 (REV. 10-2015), 
CHOOSING A RETIREMENT SOLUTION FOR YOUR SMALL BUSINESS 5 (2015), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/choosing.html; Jack VanDerhei, The Pension 
Protection Act and 401(k)s, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2008), 
http://online.wsj.com/ad/employeebenefits-pension_protection_act.html. 
 8  See VanDerhei, supra note 7.   
 9  See JEAN A. YOUNG, VANGUARD, THE AUTO SAVINGS GENERATION: STEERING 
MILLENNIALS TO BETTER RETIREMENT OUTCOMES 15 (2015), 
https://institutional.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/institutional/researchcommentary/article/I
nvResSteerMillennials.   
 10  See Daniel P. Schwallie & Allen Steinberg, How Safe Is Your ADP/ACP Safe 
Harbor?, 29 BENEFITS Q., Oct. 2013, at 35, 35–36.   
 11  Id. at 36.   
 12  See Retirement Plans and ERISA FAQs, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_pension.html (last visited Dec. 1, 
2015).   
 13  News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee Benefits 
in the United States—March 2015 (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ebs2_07242015.htm.   
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federally guaranteed) defined contribution plans with PPA-like defaults 
regarding enrollment and age-appropriate fund selection, as well as a 
default annuity purchase at retirement.  The plans would allow individuals 
who are interested in more actively managing their savings to select from a 
limited range of age-appropriate portfolios at predetermined intervals, but 
the options and the opportunities to act would be purposefully minimal.  
Let’s call these “Shadow 401(k)s”—shadow because they’re meant to 
follow workers of all types throughout their professional lives, and also 
because they aren’t the main event or a one-size-fits-all solution to the 
retirement crisis. 
Essentially, this approach encourages workers who lack employer-
sponsored plans to save more than they pay in Social Security taxes, but 
spares them from having to select, establish, and maintain a plan 
themselves.  Expanding on the SSA’s existing infrastructure (rather than 
expanding Supplemental Security Income (SSI) taxes) has the advantage of 
minimizing administrative expenses without triggering politically charged 
tax debates.  Instituting simple defaults allows us to capitalize on the 
lessons learned from the PPA but leaves some room for individualization—
again, unlike SSI taxes.  And structuring the plans as defined contribution 
funds helps avoid the political baggage that is likely to accompany talk of a 
“federal annuity”14 or a “universal savings account.”15 
Because it does not involve federal contributions or risk-bearing, the 
Shadow 401(k) differs from similar proposals put forward by, among 
others, Teresa Ghilarducci16 and Michael Calabrese.17  This naturally 
makes the Shadow 401(k) a more incremental response to the retirement 
crisis and invites—indeed, likely necessitates—alteration down the road.  
And forced savings without a federal guarantee, savings credit, or matching 
feature increases the burden on low-wage earners at a time when they are 
already hurting. 
However, these features may also make the Shadow 401(k) more 
legislatively viable in a period of considerable political tumult and 
decreased bipartisan support for similar plans, while simultaneously 
addressing many of the major problems that scholars like Ghilarducci and 
 
 14  But cf. Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Converting 401(k) 
Accounts into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 277, 320–30 
(2010) (advocating for a “government-subsidized annuity”).   
 15  The “Universal Savings Account” plan President Clinton floated in the late 1990s 
required the federal government to match any percentage of savings.  See George Hager & 
Amy Goldstein, Clinton Details New Retirement Plan, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 1999), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/security/stories/accounts041599.htm.   
 16  See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, ECON. POLICY INST., GUARANTEED RETIREMENT 
ACCOUNTS: TOWARD RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 17 (2007). 
 17  See MICHAEL CALABRESE, NEW AM. FOUND., FACING UP TO THE RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS DEFICIT: FROM 401(K)S TO UNIVERSAL AND AUTOMATIC ACCOUNTS 13 (2011). 
42 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 92 
Calabrese have identified in current or proposed retirement systems.18  
Indeed, some states have approximated this approach.19  Starting in 2017, 
for instance, Illinois “will automatically enroll workers without a 
retirement account into a portable, state-run individual retirement plan 
called the Secure Choice Pension.”20  Programs like Secure Choice have 
the same advantages and disadvantages as the Shadow 401(k), but with the 
added weakness that they depend upon the political climate of individual 
states.  The Shadow 401(k) provides a feasible federal foundation on which 
we can build as the opportunity arises and—while we wait—offers a small 
step towards ensuring that Americans have more money waiting for them at 
retirement.21 
B.   Bad Employer Incentives 
Just as the current system doesn’t give workers the best incentives to 
save, it also doesn’t encourage employers to help workers save.  To begin 
with, employers have little reason to take on the responsibilities and costs 
of sponsoring a retirement plan in a climate where workers change jobs 
frequently.  The average baby boomer worker has held 11.7 jobs between 
the ages of eighteen and forty-eight,22 and the average wage and hour job is 
now held for around 4.6 years.23  These figures aren’t significantly higher 
today than they were before the 2008 Recession, and they’re also not 
higher for millennials than for older workers (even though media coverage 
tends to suggest otherwise in both cases).24 
 
 18  See, e.g., Automatic IRA Act of 2015, H.R. 506, 114th Cong.  The latest version of 
the congressional Auto-IRA proposal, H.R. 506, still relies on employers to create plans and 
exempts those employers with fewer than ten employees from even that obligation.  See id. 
§ 2. 
 19  These include Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and California.  Look to the States for Innovation, GEORGETOWN UNIV.’S 
CTR. FOR RET. INITIATIVES, http://cri.georgetown.edu/states/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 




 21  The myRA program recently established by the Obama Administration does offer a 
federal avenue for payroll-deduction retirement savings, but enrollment in myRA depends 
on worker initiative.  See myRA: How It Works, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
https://myra.gov/how-it-works/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
 22  News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, USDL-15-0528, 
Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market Activity, and Earnings Growth Among the Youngest 
Baby Boomers: Results From a Longitudinal Study 1 (Mar. 31, 2015). 
 23  News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, USDL-14-1714, 
Employee Tenure in 2014, at 1 (Sept. 18, 2014).   
 24  See STEVEN F. HIPPLE & EMY SOK, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, TENURE OF AMERICAN WORKERS 2–3 (2013), 
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But statistics on job-hopping do indicate the existence of a generalized 
and long-term shift in employer-employee relations such that both parties 
increasingly view their relationship as disposable.25  For a few decades 
now, employers—even healthy employers—have been more willing to lay 
off workers in the interests of maximizing shareholder profits, and workers 
have become more likely to view their careers in terms of building a 
personal brand across employers rather than a record of good service within 
one company.26  All of this adds up to an environment in which “the long-
standing assumption of long-term attachment between an employee and a 
single firm has broken down.”27 
Relatedly, some features of the existing legal and regulatory structure 
surrounding employment strongly incentivize employers to create distance 
between themselves and workers via reclassification.  Reclassification, or 
the practice of categorizing workers as “independent contractors” instead of 
as “employees,” relieves an employer from fulfilling certain tax and (non-
ERISA) employee benefits obligations, and it also takes the entire issue of 
ERISA benefits off the table.  Employers in the “sharing” or “platform” 
economy have developed new business models that capitalize on this 
distinction between employees and independent contractors, while many 
traditional industries like construction and delivery have long relied on a 
workforce largely composed of independent contractors.28  If the move 
towards independent contracting and gig work continues, even more 
workers will be ineligible for employer-sponsored retirement plans.  Even 
platform companies are beginning to speak up about this problem: in late 
2015, a group of executives, venture capitalists, and policy analysts issued 
 
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2013/tenure/; Ben Casselman, Enough Already About the Job-
Hopping Millennials, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 5, 2015), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/enough-already-about-the-job-hopping-millennials; Jeanne 
Meister, Job Hopping Is the ‘New Normal’ for Millennials: Three Ways to Prevent a Human 
Resource Nightmare, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeannemeister/2012/08/14/job-hopping-is-the-new-normal-for-
millennials-three-ways-to-prevent-a-human-resource-nightmare/#47323aaf5508.   
 25  See Declining Employee Loyalty: A Casualty of the New Workplace, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 9, 2012), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/declining-employee-loyalty-a-casualty-of-the-
new-workplace/.   
 26  Wharton professor Adam Cobb observed that “[f]irms have always laid off 
workers, but in the 1980s, you started to see healthy firms laying off workers, mainly for 
shareholder value. . . . If I’m an employee, that’s a signal to me that I’m not going to let 
firms control my career.”  Id.   
 27  KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION 
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 3 (2004).   
 28  See generally Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Employment Relationships in the 
Sharing Economy, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. RESP. 1 (2016).   
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a joint letter calling for “portable benefits” plans that would follow 
independent contractors across jobs.29 
Finally, there’s a fair bit working against those employers who do 
categorize their workers as “employees” and who want to sponsor some 
sort of retirement plan.  Economies of scale prevent most small businesses 
from being able to afford mainstream plans, while the range and 
complexity of choices often overwhelm small-business owners.  In fact, 
only 14% of small-business employers sponsor retirement plans of any 
kind.30  It’s true that the market is starting to produce some solutions: 
startups like Honest Dollar and ForUsAll offer plans specifically priced for 
small businesses with relatively jargon-free descriptions and easy online 
maintenance.31  Some of these plans even support independent 
contractors.32  But these are relatively niche options and they replicate the 
existing system’s reliance on employer initiative. 
The Shadow 401(k) system can address all of these problems because 
it is independent of employer intent, resources, and skill.  Even under a 
Shadow 401(k) system many employers will find it necessary to offer 
sponsored benefit plans to recruit high-skill workers.  But workers who 
would appreciate the ease of an employer-sponsored plan will no longer be 
obliged to wait for their employers to make the first move, and workers 
whose employers will never make the first move—or workers who are self-
employed or operate in the platform economy—will still have a way to 
save more. 
At the same time, it’s worth remembering that even adequate Shadow 
401(k) savings don’t inevitably translate into a comfortable retirement for 
at least three reasons: those savings are vulnerable to market fluctuations (a 
challenge that cannot be avoided without some element of federally 
guaranteed returns or benefits), they still need to be managed and spent 
 
 29  Byron Auguste et al., Common Ground for Independent Workers, MEDIUM (Nov. 9, 
2015), https://medium.com/the-wtf-economy/common-ground-for-independent-workers-
83f3fbcf548f#.ucsxz2uou; see also Nick Hanauer & David Rolf, Shared Security, Shared 
Growth, 37 DEMOCRACY, July 2015, at 6, 14 (describing the Shared Security System “as 
analogous to Social Security, but encompassing all of the employment benefits traditionally 
provided by a full-time salaried job”).   
 30  CHARLES A. JESZECK, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-748T, 
RETIREMENT SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR EMPLOYEES OF SMALL BUSINESSES 
8 (2013). 
 31  See Stacy Cowley, Tailoring Retirement Plans to Companies with a Handful of 
Workers, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/business/smallbusiness/tailoring-retirement-plans-to-
companies-with-a-handful-of-workers.html.   
 32  See What Types of Companies or Entities Can Use Honest Dollar?, HONEST 
DOLLAR, https://help.honestdollar.com/hc/en-us/articles/213564288-What-types-of-
companies-or-entities-can-use-Honest-Dollar- (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).   
2016] A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  R E T I R E M E N T  C R I S I S  W I T H  S H A D O W  4 0 1 ( K ) S  45 
wisely (a challenge I discuss later in this Essay), and they are taxed very 
differently than other capital gains (which I leave for another day). 
C.   Low Income 
Legal scholars concerned with the retirement crisis—whether writing 
from within employee benefits, elder law, or tax—all generally focus on 
providing the right incentives and the right infrastructure to facilitate 
savings.33  This is well and good, since there is much work to be done on 
both fronts.  Nevertheless, it doesn’t help much to incentivize or facilitate 
saving if workers have no money to save. 
This is not just a “minimum wage” issue.  Technically, only around 
three million workers earn below the current federal minimum wage of 
$7.25 per hour, and these folks definitely do not have the ability to save for 
retirement.34  When we ask whether workers are able to save for retirement, 
we’re really discussing workers who earn at or above the minimum wage 
and how changes in income affect their behavior.  Unfortunately, the BLS 
Consumer Expenditure Reports do not distinguish between pensions, 
personal insurance, and payments to Social Security, and there’s very little 
information available elsewhere on retirement savings relative to income 
fluctuation. 
A few facts suggest that we may want to pay more attention to 
workers’ ability to forego income in the interests of contributing to any 
type of retirement scheme.  Readers should note that these facts are not 
meant to suggest linear causation—that is, they don’t tell us that workers 
aren’t saving more because they can’t afford to.  But they do suggest that 
savings practices (which were likely never ideal for the reasons identified 
by behavioral economics scholars) have taken an extra hit thanks to wage 
 
 33  See, e.g., Frolik, supra note 14, at 278; Teresa Ghilarducci, Retirement Security 
Worse on ERISA’s 40th Anniversary, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 453, 459 (2014); Daniel Halperin, 
Employer-Based Retirement Income—the Ideal, the Possible, and the Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 
37, 44 (2003).   
 34  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT 1054, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS, 2014, at 1 (2015).  Readers should note 
that the “three million workers” statistic is highly misleading since state laws require 
employers to “top off” a tipped worker’s wages at vastly differing rates (or not at all)—and 
even where topping off requirements are comparatively generous, enforcement often 
remains weak.  See SUZANNE DERSHOWITZ ET AL., FOOD LABOR RESEARCH CTR., WORKING 
BELOW THE LINE: HOW THE SUBMINIMUM WAGE FOR TIPPED RESTAURANT WORKERS 
VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 15 (2015), 
http://rocunited.org/wp2015b/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/WorkingBelowTheLine_LRR.pdf (discussing wage theft); 
Minimum Wage for Tipped Employees, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/state/tipped.htm (listing the direct wage, tip credit, and overall 
minimum wage requirements for each state). 
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stagnation, job loss, and financial emergencies associated with the 
Recession.35  Consider the following: 
• The National Institute on Retirement Security reports that the 
average working household has a median retirement account 
balance of just $2500.36 
• Pew Trusts states that about 70% of American households qualify 
as savings-limited, income-constrained, or debt-challenged,37 
while 32% face two or more of these problems.38  Moreover, this 
was the case both before and after the Recession.39 
• The Federal Reserve observes that 57% of respondents who had 
savings before 2008 had, largely because of the Recession, used 
up “some” to “all” of those savings by 2013.40 
The first two facts point to the general financial strain felt by working 
families, while the Federal Reserve’s finding suggests that this strain was 
exacerbated by the Recession.  Again, this is not to say that we can ignore 
bad savings practices.  But the assumption characterizing much of the 
literature on the retirement crisis—that the problem lies in worker or 
employer incentives or taxation—replicates the view that expenditures are 
a proxy for valuation.  Before we go full steam ahead in our efforts to 
change workers’ valuation of saving for retirement or try to capitalize on 
workers’ tendency to inaccurately express their valuation, we should ask 
ourselves whether the proxy really applies.41  If it doesn’t, and if part of the 
issue is that workers simply don’t have enough to save enough, then 
scholars and practitioners who are interested in addressing the retirement 
crisis must join the larger conversation on employment conditions and 
income inequality that is taking place in America today. 
 
 35  See generally Michael Lind, Opinion, Can You Have a Good Life if You Don’t 
Have a Good Job?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/opinion/sunday/can-you-have-a-good-life-if-you-dont-
have-a-good-job.html. 
 36  NARI RHEE & ILANA BOIVIE, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., THE CONTINUING 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS CRISIS 1 (2015).   
 37  ERIN CURRIER ET AL., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF FAMILY 
BALANCE SHEETS 1 (2015).   
 38  See id. at 13.   
 39  Id. at 12.  
 40 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-
BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2013, at 2 (2014).   
 41  The most relevant of these concepts are “willingness to pay” (the amount A is 
willing to spend for a widget is a reflection of the value A subjectively ascribes to the 
widget) and “income effect” (as A’s income fluctuates, so will A’s consumption).  The 
problems, of course, are that (1) A is not a rational, self-aware, and self-controlled actor, and 
(2) valuation itself fluctuates.  See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. 
& ECON. 1 (1960); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and 
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).   
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II.     THE “MANAGEMENT PROBLEM” 
Even workers who manage to set aside enough money during their 
careers face the difficult task of managing that money before and after 
retirement.  This Part considers three kinds of obstacles to the proper 
management of retirement savings: poor decisionmaking before retirement, 
basic capability and financial literacy, and decisionmaking by retirees 
coping with physical or mental decline.  It also shows how “Shadow 
401(k)s” can help address aspects of the “management problem.” 
A.   The Long Road to Retirement 
During their professional lives, workers must make several decisions 
regarding their retirement besides determining how much they’ll save.  
What amount should they contribute to an employer-sponsored fund?  If 
there are different funds they could invest into, which ones should they 
choose?  In case of an unexpected financial stress that compels them to 
draw down on existing resources, how should they treat their retirement 
savings relative to their other assets?  The whole thing bears more than a 
passing resemblance to an obstacle course.42 
It’s just not possible to come up with general answers to these 
questions because they are incredibly dependent on context.  At the same 
time, some choices made by workers are predictable—and predictably 
flawed.  For example, many workers trigger “leakage[s]” from their 401(k) 
accounts—that is, they draw on their retirement savings before 
retirement.43  Workers might take out loans against their 401(k) funds, they 
might request hardship withdrawals in times of extreme financial need, or 
they might simply cash out their 401(k)s when shifting to a new job.44  
Hardship withdrawals come with especially heavy consequences since 
workers not only lose accumulated savings but also lose the income those 
savings might have earned while invested.45  Even ostensibly wise 
choices—like rolling over 401(k) funds from a previous job into a third-
party Individual Retirement Account (IRA)—heighten the risk of 
leakages.46  And this is hardly a niche problem: Gallup estimates that one in 
 
 42  See Monahan, supra note 4, at 478–79 (describing 401(k) employee participation 
requirements).   
 43  See Thomas Olson, Note, 401(k) Leakage: Crafting a Solution Consistent with the 
Shift to Employee-Managed Retirement Accounts, 20 ELDER L.J. 449, 451 (2012).   
 44  See id. (observing that “[l]eakage manifests itself in three forms: cash outs, loans, 
and early withdrawals” (citing Robert Steyer, DC Plan Leakage Problem Alarming, 
Solutions Evasive, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20110404/PRINT/304049977)).   
 45  See id. at 461.   
 46  This is because IRAs are not as strictly regulated as defined contribution plans, so 
IRA withdrawals are easier to effect and subject to lighter penalties.  See ALICIA H. 
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five participants in an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan has tapped into her 
plan before retirement.47 
The hassle, of course, is that workers have virtually their entire pre-
retirement lives in which to encounter financial stresses and trigger 
leakages.  Moreover, 401(k) leakages are just one type of problem 
involving one type of retirement savings device.  But even though we can’t 
solve all of the problems that come from having to manage money for 
multiple pre-retirement decades, we can fix a few key issues.  A Shadow 
401(k) system could sidestep the entire issue of job change rollovers 
because the Shadow 401(k)s would naturally follow workers to each new 
job.  The system could also avoid the problem of a worker making unwise 
and perhaps inconsistent 401(k) investment options with each new job 
because the selection would only need to be done once (or a handful of 
times, if the worker takes an active interest). 
To be sure, we would need to offer more instruction and information 
at the time of that initial choice and any subsequent adjustments.  And we 
would also need to strengthen penalties on in-service withdrawals, loans, 
and cash outs, in order to prevent workers from viewing their 401(k)s as 
just another savings account.  But these steps might also be easier with the 
kind of centralized governmental management that comes with Shadow 
401(k)s. 
B.   Capability, Social Capital, and Culture 
Of course, all of this decisionmaking assumes a great deal of 
capability and financial literacy.  Just as workers must constantly assess 
their progress to financial security and adjust their investment practices, 
retirees must constantly re-assess their rate of expenditure, determine 
which assets to draw down on first, and decide how to reconcile 
unexpected financial stresses with a fixed income.  These are complex 
issues even for bright, educated, and financially literate folks, but the 
ungraceful truth is that many Americans lack the ability to tackle such 
problems. 
Some of this is due to inadequate information and education.  For 
example, one survey asked three basic questions about percentage 
calculations, simple division, and compound interest.48  Sixteen percent of 
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respondents couldn’t answer the percentage question, one-third failed the 
division question, and almost 80% of the respondents “did not understand 
compound interest.”49  Even more discouragingly, most people aren’t 
aware of their own financial illiteracy.  The National Foundation for Credit 
Counseling found that about one in five respondents “say they can resolve 
their own problems without outside help” while another one in four reach 
out to their friends and relatives rather than to financial professionals.50  
The real surprise is that investment decisions and 401(k) leakages are only 
as bad as they are. 
The good news is that there are some things we can do in this area.  
People with more general education are likely to make better decisions.51  
People with some economics or financial literacy education are likely to 
make better decisions.52  But it’s not all about education: these decisions 
demand a not-insignificant level of capability and analytic skill.  I do not 
want to make too much of this last point—not only is it decidedly 
dispiriting, but our legal system regularly ascribes these positive qualities 
to citizens.53  Moreover, some scholars think that we underestimate 
citizens’ ability to make intelligent decisions given adequate information.54  
But it’s worth keeping in mind that the current system of retirement savings 
assumes that the average American is either smart enough to make 
complicated financial decisions, or smart enough and emotionally secure 
enough to recognize when she needs help.  That may not be the case. 
Of course, “good” decisionmaking—that is, decision-making that 
maximizes financial security—also depends heavily on environmental 
factors like social capital and culture.  Jump$tart, a non-profit advocating 
financial literacy education for high school and college students, found that 
 
 49  Id. at 445 (citing Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 48, at 37 tbl.1).   
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students’ ability to answer a basic question about smart debt correlated to 
specific demographic categories like race (whites fared better) and gender 
(males at the high school level and females at the college level fared 
better).55  These differences reflect the fact that some groups inherit 
positive social capital (like financial sophistication) while others inherit 
negative social capital (like having poor relatives).56  On top of all this, 
financial practices are tied to cultural notions of responsibility: some 
groups may place a higher value on assisting needy relatives or leaving 
bequests, while others may prioritize real property ownership.57 
The current system of employer-sponsored defined contribution plans 
is structured as if differences in intelligence, education, social capital, and 
cultural values don’t exist.  It demands that people who may lack 
significant financial literacy nonetheless make complex decisions early on 
and repeatedly throughout their lives.  It also demands that people who 
aren’t fortunate enough to have an employer-sponsored plan—the same 
people who are also likely lower on formal education and social capital—
display extra initiative and financial acumen by investigating and acquiring 
IRAs.  And finally, the system has no way of coping with the fact that 
reasonable people can disagree about how to use resources.  This last 
problem is a strange twist on the idea that workers lack incentives rather 
than income because it essentially assumes that we all have exactly the 
same incentives (saving as much as possible).  We don’t. 
A Shadow 401(k) system eliminates the first two problems because it 
involves fewer decisions during an individual’s working life, a default 
annuity purchase at retirement, and it covers any participant in the labor 
force regardless of legal classification or the availability of employer-
sponsored plans.  It also mitigates the disparity between those who value 
saving and those who prioritize other things like assisting family or 
investing in real property.  Admittedly, it does so by taking away some 
decisionmaking power from people who would prefer not to save.  But the 
truth is that this aspect of the Shadow 401(k) system is no more 
paternalistic than Social Security, and the current system doesn’t offer 
these individuals much of a choice either: they may get to buy that home or 
help that relative, but only at the cost of a painful and impoverished old 
age. 
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C.   Physical & Mental Fitness 
Even if retirees have the money, know-how, and social capital 
necessary to ensure their own comfort, they must do so at a time when they 
are confronted by physical and mental deterioration.58  Age-related decline 
is an unpleasant and tricky thing to consider, not least because there is an 
incredible diversity of opinion within the scientific community as to when, 
how, and at what rate we experience reductions in physical and mental 
capacity.59  But since it seems relatively certain that some decline is likely 
for almost all individuals, it’s worth asking how decline affects outcomes 
under the current system and whether the Shadow 401(k) offers any 
improvements.60 
We can sort cognitive decline issues into two broad categories based 
on the retirement-related problems they generate: memory loss and 
cognitive impairment.  Memory loss can complicate tasks that retirees must 
perform under the existing system, like deciding whether to withdraw more 
than the minimum distribution requirement, picking the funds from which 
they’ll withdraw assets each year, and determining whether and how they’ll 
reallocate assets after withdrawals.  Retirees suffering memory loss will 
probably find it more taxing to make these choices and may make some 
mistakes because they’ll have trouble juggling all the data points that go 
into an ostensibly simple decision like how much to withdraw from a 
401(k).  The default annuity purchase feature of Shadow 401(k)s means 
that retirees with memory loss needn’t go through this process every year 
unless, at retirement, they are so actively involved in managing their 
finances that they elect out of the annuity purchase.61 
Cognitive impairment can vary across a fairly broad spectrum, ranging 
from brain-based changes that hamper affective processing to Mild 
Cognitive Impairment to various forms of dementia.62  Overall, 30% of 
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Americans above age eighty-five are thought to be living with some form 
of dementia.63  Men and women aged sixty-five have a 11% and 19% 
lifetime risk, respectively, of developing Alzheimer’s—probably the most 
well-known form of dementia as well as one of its more severe 
variations—and that risk increases exponentially with age.64 
Depending on the severity of the impairment, retirees suffering from 
dementia may be incapable of making the annual decisions demanded by 
traditional 401(k)s.  Consequently, they stand to benefit from the default 
annuity feature of Shadow 401(k)s even more than retirees with simple 
memory loss.  Default annuity purchases may also help address the large 
but underreported phenomenon of elder financial abuse, at least insofar as 
they commit a retiree’s Shadow 401(k) balance to small-increment 
disbursals rather than lump sum withdrawals. 
Physical deterioration can also impact a retiree’s ability to manage her 
money, even when that deterioration is something as run of the mill as 
sensory decline.  A recent study of adults aged fifty-five and above found 
that about one-third of men classified as “Seeing and Hearing Disabled” 
required assistance with personal finances, as did around 15% of men 
classified as “Hearing Disabled but Seeing Abled.”65  Sensory decline can 
often also lead to cognitive impairment if an individual doesn’t remain 
socially engaged—and, unsurprisingly, many elders suffering from sensory 
decline tend to isolate themselves.66  Moreover, people experiencing 
sensory impairment often pretend that they’re unaffected, which makes it 
difficult for even the most skilled and well-meaning third-party to act in a 
retiree’s interest.67  And all of this is aside from any major medical 
conditions that may directly damage a retiree’s finances or impact her 
ability to think strategically in her own long-term interest. 
CONCLUSION 
No one solution is going to rescue our decidedly imperfect retirement 
system while satisfying taxpayers, and the Shadow 401(k) is hardly an 
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exception to this rule.  Shadow 401(k)s force wealth accumulation, rather 
than provide replacement income, and they still require a not-insignificant 
level of financial knowledge on the part of workers who may not even have 
a high school education.  These problems will never truly disappear so long 
as we structure retirement around defined contribution plans where workers 
must make decisions affecting their own financial futures and bear the 
consequences of those decisions.  Shadow 401(k)s also still leave retirees 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the stock market, and consequently without a 
guaranteed amount of funds for retirement.  This problem will never 
disappear so long as we are unwilling to put the full faith and credit of the 
federal government behind potential solutions.  And Shadow 401(k)s also 
do not guarantee that workers earn enough to save enough for retirement.  
This problem will not disappear until we ask ourselves what workers need 
to earn so that they can cover both present spending and retirement saving 
in the way our system demands. 
But if we’re going to address the “retirement crisis,” we have to be 
open to multiple solutions that each effect incremental improvements.  The 
Shadow 401(k) does just this.  Because it follows workers from job to job, 
defaults into age-appropriate investment funds with minimal (but non-zero) 
opportunities for individualization, and because it attaches heightened 
requirements and penalties to leakages, the Shadow 401(k) reduces the 
odds that individuals will harm themselves through poor decisionmaking 
during their working lives.  Similarly, because it defaults into an annuity 
purchase at retirement, the Shadow 401(k) lowers the financial literacy and 
personal capability needed to manage savings after retirement.  And lastly, 
because it applies regardless of employment classification, the Shadow 
401(k) includes all participants in the labor force while functioning 
independently of employer intent, resources, and skill. 
Most importantly, however, the Shadow 401(k) is within the realm of 
political possibility.  To be sure, nothing is easy to achieve in Congress 
these days.  But the Shadow 401(k) requires no new administrative 
apparatus, no “tax,” no added cost to employers, and no pledging of the 
United States’ full faith and credit.  It doesn’t try to buck the trend of 
defined contribution plans, and it doesn’t sigh for America to be like 
Denmark.  For these reasons, the Shadow 401(k) isn’t as aggressive a 
response to the retirement crisis as some other proposals.68  At the same 
time—and for these same reasons—it may be a viable (and pliable) first 
step on the road to resolution. 
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